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The postcolonial African state is a weak
institutional structure, deficient in many
respects—in structural capacity, in the
legitimacy of authority, (and of course,
in economic performance). There is a
wide margin of difference between
states, from the relatively successful
Ghana or Uganda to disaster cases
such as Sierra Leone, but there is also a
point in common. The African state has
not inspired an intense loyalty; it has not been loved by its citizens. It
was in origin an alien imposition, the creation of European colonial rule
at the end of the nineteenth century, and a conquest state. That state
is still there now, the same territorial frontiers, the same capital cities,
even if the performance of state institutions has been weakened by
corruption and predation, as some see it by patron-client politics. And
the idea of a secular state, standing aside from religious identification,
is itself a colonial legacy, again a legacy that is still there. The state may
for the most part not be loved, there is no intense national commit-
ment, but there is also more of emotional involvement in the African
state than at first appears.
State and religion: symbiotic relations
How do the citizens imagine the state? How do the people imagine
power? The state has no surer foundations than are to be found in the
people’s imagination of authority, the symbolic language of power. The
colonial governments of Africa indirectly recognised as much when
they chose to rule through chiefly intermediaries, through chiefs who
had their own symbolic capital. Thus the European rulers could have le-
gitimacy at second hand. Postcolonial African rulers can do some of the
same with the chiefs, but in looking for a symbolic language for state
authority they have turned to the markers of religious devotion. The
holy symbols are the respected symbols, indices of devotion, of love.
Thus the postcolonial state can hope to borrow a little of its own sec-
ond-hand legitimacy, pilfered from the pious. Power in Africa is often
imagined to be of other-worldly origin, rulers can usefully suggest a re-
ligious mystique to themselves; they know where to look for the sym-
bols. Given the religious diversity of Africa, between Islam, Christianity,
and religions of African origin, they
have plenty of symbols from which to
choose. Islam and Christianity each
have their hierarchical structures of de-
votional authority, their shrines to give
a geographical focus to devotion; West
African voodoo too has its shrines, and
each of the three religious forms has its
powerfully loaded symbolic language,
a language loaded with the symbols of
power. So the state has every interest in doing political business with
the religious, however secular it may proclaim itself to be. The religious
return that interest, the state remaining the fount of resources of many
kinds, including those of symbolic endorsement.
The secular self-identification of the state in Africa is however no
mere convenient fiction. The state may borrow or pilfer from the reli-
gious in its search for symbolic authority, but it also really does have a
fundamental interest in staying secular, and in being perceived so to
do. The diversity of African religiosity means that the state stands aside
from religion in the interest of its own unity. And this basic logic still
applies where the majority of the population is Muslim, as in Senegal
where 90% of the population is Muslim but the Muslims are divided
into a number of rival Sufi orders. Sufis cherish their differences, their
devotional particularities, and in a secular state they find an authority
which respects those particularities. An “Islamic state,” the project of
an activist minority, is likely to be a great deal less tolerant of devo-
tional particularity and much more intrusive in spelling out the detail
of correct Islamic practice. And who is to be in charge of an Islamic
state? Muslims are divided in many ways: in Sufi orders, in sects, in rival
ethnicities or racial categories, and in rival schools of thought. Only a
charismatic leadership could hold such diversity together, an Islamic
Leninism, and charisma as we know does not last.
Love transactions
So back to the secular state, a state that knows how to mind its own
business, to respect devotional diversity. In giving that respect, in its
symbolic recognition of the differently devout, the state may begin in
return to win that warmth of popular respect which it so badly needs.
The state has an interest in the differ-
ences, the interest of its own indis-
pensability; and the differences have
an interest in the state, the interest of
their own preservation. But more than
interest may be involved here; as the
state does its pilgrimages to the differ-
ent holy places, be present for the holy
occasions, it begins to be recognised
not only as a valuable witness but as
“our” state, a possible object of love.
Love too is a transaction, and the
African state need not be so wholly
bereft.
Islam, Society & the State
Postcolonial Africa has witnessed problematic
processes of nation and state building, but in
general the state structures as designed in
late-colonial and early independence endure,
including their secular orientation. 
A major challenge for the state in Africa is to
advance its respect for devotional diversity,
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